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Abstract: The 5th Division’s inception, 
career, and eventual fate in the 
First World War were powerfully 
conditioned by Canadian political 
imperatives, manpower availability, 
and tension between the Canadian 
authorities’ desire to satisfy British 
demands for another division and 
recognition of manpower shortages. 
Activated in part to ensure a divisional 
command for the son of Sam Hughes, 
it was disbanded once the threat 
of Hughes and other polit ical 
necessities had receded. Its well-
trained personnel were a valuable 
addition to the Canadian Corps, when 
replacements were at a premium. 
The unhappy career of the division 
illustrates how political expediency 
powerfully influenced decision-
making, but also the limits of senior 
Canadian politicians and officers 
willingness to satisfy domestic and 
imperial political demands.
During the First World War, the 5th Canadian Division fought 
no battles, won no honours, and 
earned no glory. Histories of the war 
accord it no more than the briefest of 
mentions, and even then its status 
is often misrepresented. It is a case 
study on the salient influence of 
political expediency and the limits 
on the Canadian conduct of the war. 
Coveted by the British, but regarded 
with ambivalence by its Canadian 
political and military superiors, 
the division’s course and fate were 
powerfully influenced by the three 
intertwined factors of politics, 
manpower availability, and British 
demands for another fighting division 
at the front. Political expediency led 
to its formation, the appointment of 
its commander, its continued survival 
in the face of Canadian manpower 
shortages, and finally to its eventual 
disbandment. Recruitment problems 
crucially impacted the division, as 
the Canadian political authorities 
tried to strike a balance between their 
desire to satisfy the British demands 
for a fifth Canadian division on the 
Western Front and the ability to 
maintain the four existing divisions 
on active service. The British high 
command was keen to add another 
superb Canadian division at the front, 
and it was relentless in pressuring 
Canadian authorities for it. The 
aim of this article is to describe 
and analyze the history of the 5th 
Division through the lens of three 
factors listed above. The paper 
examines the circumstances of the 
division’s formation, the selection of 
its commander, the rationale for its 
continued existence, struggles with 
the British regarding its status, and 
the division’s fate.
Dawn
In the summer of 1916, Sir Sam Hughes, the minister of militia 
and defence, believed Canada could 
raise more divisions than the four it 
had already fielded. Hughes was the 
dominant figure in the 5th Division’s 
formation and development. The 
mercurial Hughes, aged 63, was 
a self-made man from Lindsay, 
Ontario, whom Sir Robert Borden, the 
Canadian prime minister, appointed 
to the Militia and Defence portfolio 
in 1911. Hughes was pugnacious, 
partisan, grandiose, frenetic, and 
unfettered by self-doubt. He was 
supremely confident in his judgment 
of people and situations.3 This 
attitude contributed to Hughes’ 
desire for personal control over “his 
boys.” He established a confused 
and overlapping set of authorities 
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It [5th Division] embodied the patriotism, the hopes, the ambitions and the concentrated effort of more than 
eighteen thousand Canadian citizens in the full vigor of their physical and intellectual manhood … yet it was 
destroyed and broken in an official letter covering one typewritten sheet.
“Canada’s Fifth Division: A History”1
The Fifth Division was one of the liabilities the Union Government took over. It was a mistake from the start.
Toronto Star, March 19182
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that reflected his desire to 
centralize all decision-making 
under his aegis.4 Hughes was 
also a dangerous man to cross 
– although a staunch friend – 
he was an inveterate enemy to 
those he thought wronged him 
or his cause.
Discovering Austral ia 
had five divisions in France 
and two in Egypt, Hughes 
believed Canada, with its 
larger population, “can put at 
least eight if not ten Divisions 
into the field.”5 Australia’s 
male population in 1911 was 
2.3 million versus Canada’s 
3.8 million, suggesting that 
Hughes’ notion was not entirely 
far-fetched.6 He immediately 
followed by ensuring a cadre 
remained in England that 
could help form a fifth and 
sixth division when the 4th 
Canadian Division left England 
for France in August 1916. 
The 4th Division’s artillery 
remained for further training 
and could be co-opted for the 
5th Division – the 4th Division in 
France was supported by the British 
Lahore Division’s artillery.7 
In September 1916, Hughes 
promised the chief of the imperial 
general staff (CIGS), General Sir 
William Robertson, that a fifth 
division would be ready in November 
and a sixth early in the New Year.8 
This promise indicated Hughes was 
confident he would remain in charge 
of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
(CEF) and could fulfill his pledge. It 
also illustrated the degree to which 
Hughes was out of touch with the 
declining volunteer rate in Canada, 
a subject to be discussed later, and 
the consequent impact on providing 
replacements for the Canadian 
Corps. Hughes was adamant that the 
battalions intended to form the 5th 
Division must not be used to supply 
drafts to the divisions at the front. In 
October, he responded to the request 
from the Canadian authorities in 
England to break up battalions to 
provide replacements for the heavy 
losses suffered by Canadian divisions 
on the Somme with, “Stand firm. 
Let our divisions rest. We will get 
all six divisions in shape. Surely 
Byng cannot repeat June 3rd every 
month [referring to the costly Battle 
of Mount Sorrel].”9 This order came 
at a time when the corps had already 
suffered 18,000 casualties on the 
Somme, with an estimated 7,000 more 
by the end of the month and only 
13,000 replacements available.10
An unattributed document, but 
which appears from internal evidence 
to date from October or November 
1916, suggested the means by which 
Hughes planned to maintain six 
divisions in the field.11 The document 
called for a force of two corps of three 
divisions each, with one division 
per corps always out of the line to 
absorb replacements and conduct 
training. This proposal meant no 
more than four divisions would 
be in the firing line at a time, 
so no additional troops would 
be exposed to enemy fire, and, 
therefore, would not increase the 
replacement burden. This plan, 
however, required the British 
to agree to the restricted usage 
of the additional divisions – a 
restriction they neither would 
nor could accept, as military 
exigencies might demand that 
all the divisions be committed 
to the line. Borden would later 
use a variant of this approach to 
demonstrate to the British that 
he was willing to send the 5th 
Division to the front, but with 
unacceptable conditions. 
W h i l e  n o t  o f f i c i a l l y 
authorized,  the  planning 
for the formation of the 5th 
Division proceeded during the 
fall of 1916 as the Canadian 
authorities in England struggled 
to gather the specialists and 
equipment needed for a full 
division, while trying to satisfy 
the replacement demands of the 
Canadian Corps.12 An active service 
division required a core of 12 infantry 
battalions, plus pioneer, medical, 
engineer, supply, signals, artillery, 
and headquarters units, amounting to 
about 18,000 men. These units needed 
officers, NCOs, men, equipment, and 
training supplies if the division was 
to embark for the continent, but all 
were in short supply.
Detour
Momentous changes in the political and military structure 
of the overseas forces interrupted 
the formation of the 5th Division. 
By late 1916, the administrative and 
training system in England was 
clearly not functioning effectively. 
The most obvious manifestation of 
this failure was the system’s inability 
to replace the losses incurred on the 
Somme. Despite the availability of 
126,420 men in England in November 
The pugnacious Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, 
minister of militia and defence from 1911-1916, 
was the dominant figure in the formation and 
development of the 5th Division.
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1916, there were only 3,387 trained 
men to meet the need for 16,188 
replacements, because men were 
tied up in battalions intended for 
the 5th and 6th Divisions, inefficient 
manpower utilization, and inadequate 
procedures for returning wounded 
men to active service.13 Senior officers 
in the Canadian Corps, the British, 
and even Borden complained about 
the disorganization and misrule.14 
Borden had a terrible dilemma. 
It was apparent Hughes could 
not rectify the serious problems 
with the overseas administration.15 
Hughes, however,  had a powerful 
constituency in Canada, believing 
his claims of accomplishments.16 
Borden, non-confrontational by 
nature, feared the damage the 
truculent Hughes could do if 
ousted. Rather than asking for 
Hughes’ resignation, Borden 
sought to marginalize him by 
establishing a separate ministry 
for overseas forces to limit Hughes’ 
control over the CEF, whilst letting 
him retain his cabinet role as the 
minister of militia for forces in 
Canada. Hughes refused to accept 
Borden’s ploy, and eventually 
his outrageous behaviour forced 
Borden to demand his resignation. 
After much anguish, intrigue, and 
pleas, Hughes finally resigned in 
November 1916.17 
This afforded Borden the 
opportunity to make changes. Sir 
George Perley, an astute politician 
and an anglophile, would head a 
new ministry of Overseas Military 
Forces of Canada (OMFC), and 
retain his position as acting high 
commissioner in London.18 The 
new ministry would take over 
from the militia department the 
large, and hitherto chaotic Canadian 
organization of training camps, 
barracks, supply depots and other 
facilities in England. The intention 
was that the organization in England 
should more effectively carry out it 
prime responsibility for dispatching 
trained reinforcements to the corps. 
In Canada, Borden appointed Sir 
Edward Kemp as minister of militia 
in place of Hughes. Kemp had served 
as a minister without portfolio at the 
start of the war. He acted as Borden’s 
t rouble-shooter  invest igat ing 
operations of various departments 
and then served as the first chairman 
of the War Purchasing Committee 
in 1915.19 Again, the intention was 
that the forces in Canada should 
better support the overseas effort by 
more efficiently organizing, training 
and dispatching reinforcements to 
England. In late 1917, Kemp would 
replace Perley as the minister of 
the OMFC, while Major-General 
Sir Sydney Mewburn took over the 
militia portfolio.
What is puzzling is that, despite 
his history of petulance and penchant 
for partisan attacks on political 
enemies, Hughes offered only a 
muted reaction to the devastating loss 
of his ministry. Certainly, there were 
instructions to Conservatives not to 
attack Hughes unless he attacked 
the government.20 Hughes’ actions, 
so contrary to his modus operandi, 
strongly suggest there was an 
undocumented quid pro quo. Most 
likely it involved Garnet Hughes 
– Sam Hughes’ son – receiving 
command of a division, based on 
Borden’s singular, repeated, and 
fervent lobbying on behalf of the 
younger Hughes to be discussed 
below. Borden’s campaign was a 
recurring strand of politics that 
influenced the course of the 5th 
Division; Garnet Hughes was 
indeed eventually appointed to 
command the division. 
Garnet Burke Hughes, was 
a 33-year-old Canadian Militia 
officer and civil engineer. He 
graduated from Canada’s Royal 
Military College – first in his 
class in 1901 – passed the Militia 
Staff Course, had long service in 
the Militia, and was the junior 
major in Arthur Currie’s 50th 
Regiment in Victoria before the 
war.21 Hughes, early in the war, 
was the brigade-major of Richard 
Turner’s 3rd Brigade in the 1st 
Canadian Division, with the rank 
of lieutenant-colonel, a full rank 
higher than normal for such an 
appointment.22 He performed 
poorly in the Battle of Second Ypres 
and the British commander of the 
1st Division, Lieutenant-General 
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Major-General Garnet Hughes, 
pictured here as a brigadier when he 
commanded 1st Canadian Infantry 
Brigade, did not distinguish himself 
early in the war but his father’s 
patronage secured him command of 
5th Division.
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Sir Edwin Alderson, transferred him 
to the 2nd Division.23 Through his 
father’s influence, Hughes received 
command of the 1st Brigade in 
November 1915 which he led at 
Mount Sorrel and on the Somme, 
where he neither distinguished nor 
disgraced himself.24 The strains 
of command, however, wore him 
down.25 
The first opportunity for Borden 
to intervene to secure Garnet a 
division came when command of 
the 2nd Division became available. 
With the formation of the new 
overseas ministry, Perley appointed 
Major-General Richard Turner VC, 
commander of 2nd Division, to head 
Canadian forces in England. Borden 
was anxious that Garnet replace 
Turner, but the commander of the 
Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General 
Sir Julian Byng, preferred Major-
General Henry Burstall, a Canadian 
Permanent Force officer.26 Borden 
was unhappy with the selection and 
argued “I have no doubt that the man 
selected by Byng is much inferior 
to other mentioned [Garnet].”27 
Perley, given the final authority on 
promotions by Borden, respected 
Byng and was determined to 
minimize the appearance of political 
influence.28 Perley accepted Byng’s 
recommendation and thus thwarted 
the prime minister.29 
Doubts About a 
Fifth Division
The new ministers, Perley and Kemp, had serious doubts as to 
the viability of a fifth division. Perley 
informed Borden in early November 
1916 that, despite British pressure, 
it was unlikely there were sufficient 
troops to maintain a fifth division.30 In 
December, Perley asked Kemp for an 
estimate of manpower availability for 
the next six months to determine the 
formation’s fate. Perley admitted to 
being torn between his imperial duty 
in satisfying the CIGS and keeping 
the existing forces at full strength.31 
Kemp’s response was Canada could 
send 15,000 men every three months 
for the next nine months, but that this 
would be insufficient to maintain the 
existing forces.32 In addition, Kemp 
was adamant that the 5th Division 
should not be sent to the front, and, 
believing Perley was considering 
acceding to the British demands, 
pointedly asked Borden if “Canadian 
authorities in England intend to 
act independent of our advice with 
regard to this matter.”33 Perley had to 
write Kemp a soothing letter making 
it clear that while the formation of the 
division was to proceed, it was not 
deploying to France.34
Decision
Unexpectedly, in late December, Perley gave Turner permission 
to proceed with the division’s 
tentat ive  act ivat ion. 35 Turner 
hurriedly inspected the infantry 
battalions at Witley to select which 
would join the division. Turner must 
not have been satisfied, as he ordered 
one battalion (156th Battalion) that 
had already been broken up to 
The Hughes family at the Front. Major-General Sir Sam Hughes, Brigadier-
General Garnet Hughes, and Brigadier-General William St. Pierre Hughes, 
Sam’s brother, August 1916.
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be reformed, the 104th PEI and 
105th New Brunswick Battalions 
to be amalgamated, and another 
transferred to the division from 
Bramshott camp (160th Battalion).36 
Turner had to strike a balance 
between the military effectiveness of 
the battalions available, the regional 
origin of the units, and the ability to 
maintain their strength. As a result, 
the division initially consisted of six 
battalions from Ontario, two from 
Quebec, and one each from Alberta, 
Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, 
and Nova Scotia. Later shortages 
of manpower necessitated breaking 
up the two Western Canadian 
and one Quebec battalions and 
their replacement by three Ontario 
battalions.37
Given the considerable doubts 
expressed by both the ministers of 
militia and OMFC, why then did 
Perley authorize the formation of 
the division? It was apparent that 
it was unlikely ever to deploy to 
France, and the costs of equipping 
and maintaining the division were 
considerable. The Quartermaster-
General’s department estimated the 
additional equipment and yearly 
operating costs for the 5th Division’s 
transportation at £245,000 or over 
a million dollars over the costs for 
a standard training camp.38 The 
most likely reason for the division’s 
formation was political expediency 
in providing a divisional command 
for Garnet Hughes. Borden was once 
again exceedingly anxious about 
who was to command the division, 
cabling Perley in late January, 
“Please consult me before final 
decision. This is very important.”39 
Typically, Borden only intervened 
in politically sensitive matters, and 
he had explicitly granted Perley 
complete authority over promotions, 
so this interference suggests he had 
a political agenda, especially as the 
incumbent commander had seniority 
over Hughes, as discussed below.40 
5th Division Simplified Organization Chart
Sir George Perley, head of the Overseas 
Military Forces of Canada (OMFC) 
and acting high commissioner was 
caught between serving the Empire and 
Canadian manpower realities.
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Shortly after Perley’s decision 
to activate the division in early 
January, Turner asked Hughes, 
still commanding the 1st Brigade, 
if he would accept command with 
the stipulation that the division 
might not proceed overseas, 
at least until the replacement 
situation improved.41 Hughes 
r e p l i e d  o n  2 0  J a n u a r y , 
accepting the appointment 
and seeking Turner’s support, 
and hoping his acceptance 
would not preclude him from 
the opportunity to command 
a division at the front.42 The 
Canadian Representative to the 
British General Headquarters 
in France, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Manley Sims, formally offered 
the division to Hughes, on 3 
February. Hughes accepted 
with the information from Sims 
that Canadian authorities did 
not intend to send the division 
to France. Sims informed Turner 
that Hughes was not in good 
health and should be recalled 
immediately – photographs 
of Hughes, as commander of 
1st Brigade, show a haggard 
figure.43 Byng, in his congratulatory 
note to Hughes on his appointment, 
commented “When you left I thought 
you anything but quite fit and that 
you really wanted a proper rest.”44 
The 5th Division’s war diary recorded 
Hughes’ appointment on 10 February, 
and he took over the division three 
days later.45 On learning of Hughes’ 
appointment from Perley, Borden 
cabled, “Quite approve of proposed 
appointment.”46 
Hughes was junior  to 
the incumbent  divis ional 
commander, Brigadier-General 
R.G.E. Leckie, and this provides 
further evidence that Hughes’ 
appointment was politically 
motivated. Leckie’s promotion 
to command of a brigade at 
the front predated Garnet’s, 
and Leckie had been the chief 
of the general staff on the 
elder Hughes’ Acting Sub-
Militia Council, until relieved 
by Turner in December 1916. 
Leckie would have been an 
Headquarters personnel of 5th Canadian Division.  Major-General Garnet Hughes is seated fifth from the right.
Lieutenant-General Sir Richard 
E.W. Turner, VC, general officer 
commanding the Canadian Forces 
in the British Isles and later chief 
of the general staff of the OMFC, 
was the man who had to provide 
replacements for the losses 
suffered by Canadian units on the 
Western Front.
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understandable appointment given 
his experience, seniority, and the 
need to find him a substantive post 
in England commensurate with his 
rank. His relief was “a complete 
surprise” to Leckie, and he was 
incensed that a third officer junior 
to him had received a division – the 
other two being Major-General David 
Watson (4th Division), and Major-
General H. Burstall (2nd Division). 
Leckie demanded another command 
at the front or at least a promotion to 
major-general to antedate Garnet’s 
promotion in recognition of his being 
superseded. Perley had no position to 
offer Leckie in England; the Canadian 
Corps did not want him, so Perley 
had to inveigle Kemp in Canada to 
find Leckie a suitable position and 
promotion.47 
Decline in Recruiting
The second factor influencing the fate of the 5th Division was the 
Borden government’s mishandling 
of the manpower situation leading 
to shortfalls in replacements. Lacking 
an appreciation of manpower needs 
and resources, the government 
did not recognize the decline in 
volunteers in 1916, in part because the 
large number of battalions moving 
overseas masked the situation.48 
Many of these battalions, however, 
had not been able to recruit to 
full strength; there were severe 
difficulties finding volunteers for 
service, especially in Quebec and the 
Maritimes. According to a June 1916 
report from the Special Committee 
on Recruiting, while Ontario had 
reached 75 percent of its quota of 
recruits, the Western provinces 114 
percent, the Maritimes were only 
at 48 percent and Quebec at 25 
percent, and the Quebec total was 
predominantly English-speaking. 
The same report indicated only three 
percent of French-speaking men 
enlisted while the equivalent totals 
for Canadian-born anglophones 
were 13 percent and UK born were 
60 percent.49 The British born was 
high as a result of the recent influx 
of immigrants from the UK just prior 
to the war. 
Major-General  Willoughby 
Gwatkin, chief of the general staff in 
Ottawa, sent Borden a memo in April 
1917 setting out in detail the serious 
shortfall in manpower, and pleaded 
that 50,000 men be compelled to 
serve. Gwatkin estimated that the 
CEF needed 20,000 to 30,000 men 
over the summer, but that there 
were only 18,496 men in the CEF 
in Canada, and most of these were 
unsuitable or unavailable. Only 
4,000 men were joining per month, 
and some of these would be unfit 
for active service.50 The result of this 
was a collapse in the number of men 
arriving in England from Canada. 
The chart below illustrates how the 
numbers sent overseas declined from 
a peak of 15,197 in April 1917 to a low 
of 261 in July. The March and April 
peaks were the result of Canadian 
authorities rushing drafts to England, 
as the Admiralty could not guarantee 
protection against U-Boats in the 
long daylight hours of May, June 
and July.51 The chart illustrates 
the challenge the OMFC faced in 
finding sufficient replacements, 
as it provided almost 20,000 more 
men than it received from Canada. 
Combing-out units in England and 
returning wounded men made up 
the difference.
Demands by the British
The final factor that shaped the story of the 5th Division 
was demands by the British for its 
early dispatch to the front. In early 
November 1916, shortly after Perley 
took over as minister of the OMFC, 
he met Robertson, who made a 
strong plea to deploy the 5th Division 
to France, but Perley resisted. He 
explained the Canadian manpower 
situation to Robertson and argued 
that it was unlikely that five divisions 
could be sufficiently reinforced. 
He obtained Robertson’s grudging 
agreement that it was wiser to 
maintain four full-strength divisions 
in France than five understrength.53 
Nevertheless, the deputy CIGS wrote 
Perley on 17 November 1916 pressing 
Replacements Received and Dispatched 
January 1917 to January 191852
Received From Canada Drafts To France Differential
January 1917  3,819  3,241  578 
February 1917  3,487  4,527  (1,040)
March 1917  9,769  5,858  3,911 
April 1917  15,197  9,342  5,855 
May 1917  10,176  13,710  (3,534)
June 1917  5,317  6,242  (925)
July 1917  261  2,766  (2,505)
August 1917  2,261  4,936  (2,675)
September 1917  2,057  8,871  (6,814)
October 1917  3,160  5,584  (2,424)
November 1917  5,057  12,151  (7,094)
December 1917  3,157  3,755  (598)
January 1918  1,446  3,801  (2,355)
Total  65,164 84,784  (19,620)
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for more details on progress 
with appointing command and 
staff personnel for the division 
and reiterating Robertson’s 
interest in the division.54 Perley 
pushed back in his reply and 
asked for time to build up his 
organization before he could 
give a definitive answer.55 
The  Br i t i sh ,  recogniz ing 
Perley’s reluctance to make a 
commitment, responded with 
“Sir William Robertson hopes 
you will agree to forming a 
division at Witley as soon as 
possible, for training purposes, 
without prejudice to the question 
of its subsequently being sent 
overseas.”56 This would become 
a standard British negotiating 
tactic, in the face of Canadian 
intransigence, to move the 
Canadians closer to the position 
sought by the British.
This Canadian reluctance 
may have contr ibuted to 
Robertson’s subsequent advice 
to  the new Brit ish Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George to 
prod the Dominions to increase 
recruitment. This resulted in an 
appeal from Lloyd George to the 
Dominions requesting more men in 
December 1916.57 The British believed 
Canada could contribute more, as, at 
the beginning of 1917, the British had 
already imposed conscription and 
had 17.2 percent of its men in uniform 
while only 9.6 percent of Canadian 
men served.58 
The British doggedly persisted 
and Robertson wrote to Perley 
again on 1 January 1917 urging 
dispatch of the division to France in 
February.59 This was an impossibly 
short lead-time, even if the Canadian 
authorities been in favour of sending 
the division. Perley stalled, asked 
for yet more time to gather data 
on the reinforcement situation 
and to speak with Turner, a task 
complicated by the fact that Turner 
was implementing significant reforms 
in the Canadian administration in 
England.60 Undeterred, Robertson 
sent a handwritten note in reply four 
days later reiterating the necessity of 
sending the division to the front.61 
To reach a decision, Robertson, the 
deputy CIGS, and the secretary of 
state for war Lord Derby met with 
Perley and Turner. Not surprisingly 
given the British enthusiasm for the 
division and Canadian ambivalence, 
the two sides left with a different 
understanding of the meeting’s 
decisions. Both parties agreed that 
there were not enough drafts in the 
pipeline to maintain a fifth division 
in the field. Despite this, the British 
believed the 5th Division was to be 
manned as soon as possible with “A” 
category men - soldiers fit to serve on 
active duty – and the 4th Division’s 
artillery was to remain with the 
5th Division until replacement 
uni ts  arr ived from Canada. 62 
Perley wanted it understood that 
the 5th Division would be 
a source of replacements if 
necessary, potentially delaying 
its readiness, and agreement 
that Canada could not raise 
another divisional artillery 
formation.63 The British wanted 
the 5th Division to be used as 
replacement source only if there 
were no trained replacements 
available. In addition, as the 5th 
Division was a home defence 
unit, it required dedicated 
artillery.64 Field Marshal Sir 
Douglas Haig’s decision as the 
commander in chief of the British 
Expeditionary Force (BEF) to 
reorganize divisional artillery 
solved the artillery problem, 
by reducing the number of 
field artillery brigades per 
division. His proposals freed 
up sufficient guns to form a new 
4th Division artillery in France 
and permanently assign the 4th 
Division artillery in England to 
the 5th Division.65
Keen for a fifth Canadian 
division, Haig drove Robertson’s 
demands. In early January, he 
wanted to know from Robertson 
when it would be ready to deploy, 
as he was counting on it in his 
plans for 1917, including the Arras 
offensive and an expected attack in 
Flanders. Robertson had to inform 
Haig there was “no definite decision” 
on deploying the division.66 Haig, 
seemingly oblivious of the doubtful 
status of the division, continued all 
through 1917 to assume it would 
reach him. As late as mid-January 
1918, he still counted the 5th Division 
in his total of divisions available to 
him to commit to the line in France.67 
In February 1917, unable to 
get commitment from Canadian 
authorities in England, the British 
High Command sent a formal plea 
through the Colonial Office to 
the governor-general of Canada 
r e q u e s t i n g  m o r e  t r o o p s  a n d 
specifically the 5th Division. Perley 
advised the secretary of state for the 
On the hunt for more Canadians – General 
Sir William Robertson, British chief of 
the imperial general staff, talking to a 
Canadian officer in March 1918.
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colonies, Walter Long, not to mention 
the 5th Division in the cable, and 
warned there would be consequences 
if the request became public.68 Perley 
was most likely concerned that such 
overt British pressure would have 
negative political consequences 
and affect recruiting. The British 
approach failed.
Also in February, the War Office, 
based on instructions from the British 
War Cabinet, asked for the “despatch 
of the 5th Canadian Division to France 
as soon as its training is sufficiently 
advanced.”69 Three aspects of this 
request are interesting: the War 
Office was invoking the considerable 
prestige and power of the British 
cabinet in its request to apply more 
pressure on the anglophile Perley; 
the note included a detailed listing 
of Canadian manpower resources 
available in England and base depots 
in France to counter Canadian claims 
of insufficient replacements; and, 
the division was to move, not when 
its training was complete, but only 
when “sufficiently advanced,” 
in recognition that the Canadian 
replacement numbers were unlikely 
to be adequate. The British objective 
was to get the division to France, 
so, if the replacement situation did 
further deteriorate, it would be a far 
more difficult decision to disband it 
in France than if it were in England. It 
would, also, be an additional incentive 
for Canadian authorities to ramp up 
their recruiting effort or introduce 
compulsory service. The British 
insistence on getting the division 
to France while it was still forming 
perplexed Turner.70 In penciled 
comments on the letter, Turner 
noted that the replacements listed 
as available would be insufficient to 
cover expected losses from the spring 
offensive in which the Canadian 
Corps was to participate, so the 
British analysis was flawed. 
The War Office asked for a 
definitive answer to their earlier 
requests at the end of February. 
Perley’s deputy minister, Walter 
Gow, replied on 2 March politely 
but firmly telling the British they 
could not meet their demands. Gow 
referred to the conference in January 
and said that nothing significant had 
changed the conference’s decisions. 
Gow re i terated  the  s tandard 
Canadian position that upcoming 
operations would place a severe 
strain on the replacement system, 
thus making it impossible to support 
five divisions, and it was thus not 
advisable to send the division to 
France.71 The Canadians adopted 
a consistent position, asserting it 
was better to maintain four full-
strength divisions than five weak 
ones and that Canadian resources 
were inadequate. Subsequent events 
were to vindicate this strategy as the 
casualties at Vimy Ridge and follow-
on operations stressed the Canadian 
replacement system almost to the 
breaking point. 
During Borden’s visit to England 
for the Imperial War Conference 
early in 1917, he and Perley met with 
Long who, again, made a plea for the 
5th Division‘s commitment. Borden 
was willing to consider sending the 
division if the British could guarantee 
that only four divisions would be in 
the line at a time, harking back to 
the earlier proposal. Long could not 
possibly guarantee this, as Borden 
likely knew.72 There was one final 
attempt at a meeting of the Imperial 
War Cabinet on 30 March, where 
Borden evaded the issue when 
Robertson queried him about the 
division’s availability.73 The British 
were hoping to confront Borden 
and force a commitment in front 
of his peers, but Borden was too 
shrewd a politician to allow this to 
happen. In mid-March, as a possible 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden 
(centre) looking uncharacteristically 
determined as he stands with his 
minister of militia, Major-General S.C. 
Mewburn (left) and his minister of the 
OMFC, Sir Edward Kemp (right), July 
1918.
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compromise, Gow notified the War 
Office that the 5th Division was ready 
to move within England and Scotland 
as necessary. This would place the 
division in a more useful mobile 
role in home defence. Gow was also 
careful to ensure the War Office was 
aware the division was incomplete.74 
Nine days later, the British tested 
the division with a two-day State of 
Emergency, based on a purported 
German invasion, which the division 
passed.75 
It was not until the end of May 
that the British again returned to 
the issue of the division – more 
urgent now given the success of the 
Canadian Corps in the Arras offensive 
and Borden having announced a 
proposed conscription act. Robertson 
pointed out the satisfactory state of 
reinforcements in the Canadian Corps 
and that the division was needed at 
the front.76 Supporting Robertson’s 
position was the fact, noted in Haig’s 
diary in early July, that the Canadians 
were the only force in the BEF with a 
surplus of replacements. All the other 
contingents were under-strength.77 
Robertson, not satisfied with just a 
direct appeal to Perley, also cabled 
the Canadian governor-general on 
the necessity of getting the division 
to the front.78 Gow was finally able 
to close down the British requests 
with a carefully reasoned letter that 
explained the Canadians rather than 
having a surplus of replacements 
would probably have to use the 5th 
Division to keep the Canadian Corps 
at full strength through 1917 with 
present levels of attrition. He pointed 
out that Canadian authorities had 
already raided the 5th Division to 
supply replacements for the front.79 
In a curious coda to these 
demands for the 5th Division, in June 
1918, the new CIGS, General Sir Henry 
Wilson, made a desperate request. 
The German spring offensives had 
reduced a number of British divisions 
to cadre strength, and the British were 
anxious to field more formations. 
Wilson asked the Canadians to 
replace one battalion in each of their 
brigades with an American battalion, 
thus freeing up forces to form a fifth 
division. Alternatively he suggested 
they form a division out of Canadian 
Forestry and Railway troops. Turner 
and Kemp refused to change the 
organization of the corps, and Kemp 
pointed out the short sightedness of 
Wilson’s Forestry and Rail request as 
it would cripple timber production 
and essential railway construction.80 
Division’s Development
Returning to the division’s development, the War Office 
officially authorized its organization 
on 18 January following the 12 
January 1917 conference, with 
Turner’s headquarters issuing the 
Canadian order shortly afterwards.81 
The division formed at Witley 
Camp in Surrey, approximately 60 
kilometres southwest of London. It 
consisted of three infantry brigades 
– the 13th, 14th and 15th. Brigadier-
General J.F.L. Embury commanded 
the 13th Brigade. Embury was 
42 years old, a solicitor, and the 
prewar Militia commander of the 
95th Saskatchewan Rifle Regiment. 
He had successfully led the 28th 
(Saskatchewan) Battalion in Turner’s 
2nd Division until wounded at 
the Battle of Courcelette on 15 
September 1916. After recovering, 
he commanded the 10th Training 
Brigade, which became the 13th 
Brigade.82 The commander of the 14th 
Brigade was Brigadier-General A.E. 
Swift, who was in his late forties and 
was a Permanent Force major, with 
service in the South African War. 
Prewar, he was the inspector of arms 
and ammunition. He commanded the 
2nd Battalion in the Canadian Corps 
for over a year and then led the 11th 
Training Brigade, which became the 
14th Brigade.83 Brigadier-General 
Brigadier-General A.E. Swift (left), 
commander of the 14th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, and Major-General 
Garnet Hughes (right) along with two 
unidentified women at the 5th Canadian 
Divisional Sports Day, October 1917.
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E.C. Ashton, who would have a 
long and distinguished career in 
the Canadian Army, commanded 
the 15th Brigade. Prewar, Ashton, a 
43-year-old physician, was in charge 
of a Militia artillery battery and had 
passed the Militia Staff Course. He 
formed the 36th Battalion and later 
commanded the 9th Reserve Brigade, 
and the Canadian Training Division 
at Shorncliffe. He was recalled to 
Canada in November 1917 to take 
over as the adjutant-general, and 
he later rose to chief of the general 
staff in the late 1930s.84 It is difficult 
to evaluate the three brigadier-
generals as they did not command 
their brigades in battle, but Swift and 
Embury had commanded battalions 
at the front for an extended period, 
so were as qualified as any in the 
Canadian Corps for promotion to 
brigadier-general. Turner, as GOC 
2nd Division, rated Embury as the 
battalion commander most qualified 
for appointment as a brigade GOC in 
March 1916.85 Ashton’s later ascent 
to the senior post in the Canadian 
Army also suggests a competent 
commander.
At its activation, the division was 
incomplete, and over the course of the 
next month, three battalions (160th, 
161st, and 199th), the divisional 
signal company, brigade machine 
gun companies, engineer field 
companies, and division train arrived 
at Witley. However, Lieutenant-
Colonel Christian Hore-Ruthven, the 
British GSO 1, the chief staff officer 
of the division, did not join until 27 
February 1917. He had been GSO 
2 of the 2nd Division while Turner 
was the division’s commander, so 
his selection was likely a result of 
him being a known quantity. Hore-
Ruthven was a decorated veteran 
of the South African war and was 
wounded during 1914. Recognizing 
the necessity for front line experience 
in the division, Hughes recruited 
staff and commanders from the 
Canadian Corps. His familiarity 
with officers in the 1st Division led 
him to poach predominantly from 
the division. Currie, exasperated at 
the number of officers he was losing, 
told Hughes in May that the division 
was off-limits to further transfers, an 
understandable reaction.86
The battalions selected to make 
up the division were far from ready 
for active service, despite the troops 
being embodied for over a year on 
average.87 An early February 1917 
assessment of the division’s infantry 
units indicated a desperate need 
for trained drafts, instructors and 
new leadership.88 The training cycle 
consisted of ten weeks individual 
instruction before December 1916 
and 14 weeks thereafter, followed 
by company preparation, company 
marches, battalion exercises, brigade 
training, brigade marches and finally 
division exercises.89 As nine of the 
12 battalions arrived in England 
before October 1916, they should 
have completed the battalion level 
preparation as they had three full 
months preparation time in England. 
By February, however, only four were 
ready for company training with the 
remainder needing to complete 
individual training and receive drafts 
and instructors. Turner’s order that 
eight of the battalions provide trained 
replacements to the Canadian Corps 
further impeded progress. As a 
result, six of the eight battalions were 
under-strength, and the other two 
consisted of untrained drafts, which 
crippled their readiness.90 
Poor leadership at the battalion 
level also hampered the division’s 
Top right: Major-General E.C. Ashton, 
former commander of the 15th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, as adjutant-general of 
the Canadian Militia. He would rise to be 
the chief of the general staff.
Bottom right: Brigadier-General J.F.L. 
Embury, former commander of the 
13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 
photographed later in 1918 as head of 
the Canadian Section, GHQ.
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training. Few officers and NCOs 
had any front experience, and so 
were inadequately prepared to 
instruct their men. Hughes replaced 
five battalion commanders in May 
and June and another left because 
of illness.91 Later in January 1918, 
Hughes indicated three of his 
battalion commanders should be 
replaced if the division crossed to 
France which strongly indicates a 
weak command cadre at the battalion 
level.92
The division was beginning 
to show progress by May 1917 
regaining strength and completing 
more advanced training, such that the 
division started brigade exercises.93 
Garnet informed Currie that three 
battalions were still under-strength, 
but “We are fairly well advanced 
with the training” and would be 
ready in five to six weeks.94 
A Division in France 
for Garnet?
In June, another opportunity emerged to  provide Garnet 
Hughes with a front-line division. 
Major-General Sir Arthur Currie 
received command of the Canadian 
Corps after Haig promoted Byng 
to command Third Army. This left 
an opening for Hughes to take over 
Currie’s former command, the 1st 
Division, and Borden wanted to 
ensure Garnet received it.95 Again, 
the matter of what to do with Hughes 
loomed large. Manley Sims met 
Currie on 10 June, and Currie claimed 
Sims tried to negotiate with him 
regarding the position, but Currie 
rejected any interference.96 While 
Currie did not rule out offering 
Hughes a division, he thought the 
Permanent Force officer Brigadier-
General A.C. Macdonell a better 
choice.97 It was unlikely, however, 
that Currie had any real intention 
of giving Hughes a division, as 
demonstrated later in 1918 when he 
refused him once again. Currie later 
claimed he had to resist tremendous 
pressure from the politicians to 
select Hughes. Historians A.M.J. 
Hyatt in his biography of Currie and 
Desmond Morton in his A Peculiar 
Kind of Politics both suggest he 
probably exaggerated the pressure 
placed on him. Hyatt also argues 
Currie had a guilty conscience about 
his treatment of his former friend.98 
Currie later had a heated three-
hour meeting with Garnet who 
pleaded for the opportunity to 
command the 1st Division, but 
Currie adamantly refused. According 
to Currie, Hughes stormed out 
vowing vengeance for the rejection.99 
Henceforth, Currie believed Garnet 
was an implacable enemy and that 
Garnet and his father were sure to 
try and undermine him. However, 
Currie continued to correspond with 
Garnet and meet with him in England 
when on leave, which tends to belie 
his claim and suggests he overstated 
the animosity.100 
Disruption in England
In late May, Turner had to make the difficult decision to gut the division 
for replacements for the Canadian 
Corps – a serious setback to the 
division’s preparations. Lieutenant-
General Sir Julian Byng, earlier in 
May and still the commander of 
the Canadian Corps, was unhappy 
with the number of untrained men 
he was receiving and suggested it 
was time to use the 5th Division 
as a source of trained personnel. 
This must have been a factor in 
Turner’s decision to use the 5th 
Division for replacements.101 The 
division experienced considerable 
turnover at the battalion level as the 
desperate need for trained manpower 
necessitated scouring the division 
repeatedly for drafts and even entire 
battalions to replace losses. Between 
its official formation date of 23 January 
and the end of May, one-quarter 
of its battalions were disbanded 
because of insufficient recruits. 
Additionally, there was an imbalance 
in battalions from regions. Based on 
population, British Columbia had 
four more battalions and Quebec 
two more than they should have had, 
while Ontario had ten fewer than its 
population warranted.102 Shortfalls in 
recruiting, moreover, made the 128th 
(Saskatchewan), 199th (Quebec), 
and 202nd (Alberta) Battalions 
unsustainable, and Turner disbanded 
them in May. They were replaced by 
the 164th (Ontario), 198th (Ontario), 
and 208th (Toronto) Battalions. 
Adding to the travails of the division, 
five battalions lost a total of 2,100 
other ranks as replacements for the 
corps in France, all but destroying 
them as effective units.103 
The British Inspector of Infantry’s 
assessment of the division at the end 
of June showed only four battalions 
fit for home defence, five more 
anticipated as being ready in July 
and the remaining three not until 
August.104 Readiness for home 
defence was a lower standard than for 
overseas service, which underlined 
how far the division would have to 
progress to be efficient for service on 
the Western Front. Hore-Ruthven, 
the division’s GSO 1, was even more 
pessimistic as he estimated that nine 
battalions would complete battalion 
training only in August and three 
in September. This did not include 
brigade or division exercises. In 
addition, three of the battalions were 
new to the division, and he rated 
them as weak or only fair.105 
Through June and July the division 
conducted individual and battalion 
level training. Then, peculiarly, at 
the end of July the King inspected the 
division, which was traditionally the 
last act before proceeding overseas, 
but, as the earlier evaluations attest, 
the division was far from ready.106 
At the same time, according to the 
unpublished 5th Division history, 
Turner queried Hughes as to when 
the division would be ready to 
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proceed to France, and Hughes 
thought they would be ready by the 
first week of August. Apparently, 
there were considerations of sending 
the division over, but probably notice 
of the long-planned Canadian attack 
at Hill 70, finally launched 15 August 
1917, and the expected casualties, 
necessitated second thoughts.107 In 
June, Turner believed it would be 
possible to commit the 5th Division 
at the beginning of August if Canada 
could provide an additional 10,000 
men by August and another 10,000 
by October.108 In July, however, only 
261 men and 2,261 in August arrived 
from Canada.109 Borden at the end of 
June informed Perley he wanted to 
give volunteering more time before 
enforcing the proposed Military 
Service Act – conscription.110 This 
effectively ended any possibility of 
gaining the additional recruits that 
Turner needed. Two days after the 
King’s inspection, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hore-Ruthven transferred to take 
over as the GSO 1 of the 3rd Division 
in the Canadian Corps. This move 
further indicated the improbability 
of the Division reaching France.111 
In August, instead of embarking 
the full division, Perley and Turner 
decided to send the 5th Division’s 
artillery to France at the request of the 
CIGS, along with supporting signals 
and supply units.112 This was the only 
formation of the division to serve 
at the front. Compared to infantry, 
artillery units did not have the same 
casualty rate and so did not present 
the same demands for replacements. 
The preparations for the artillery to 
move began on 7 August, with the 
artillery inspected by the Duke of 
Connaught, the former Canadian 
governor-general, on 14 August, and 
it embarked six days later.113
For the remainder of the year, the 
division conducted more elaborate 
and extensive brigade level exercises, 
including six-day marches, trench 
warfare training, and practice attacks. 
In October, the engineers were 
reassigned to help build aerodromes 
for the Royal Air Force, which was 
another sign that the division’s future 
was bleak.114 
Denouement
While the division trained in England, attacks at Hill 70 
in August and Passchendaele in 
October and November 1917 drained 
the available manpower pool, and 
it became increasingly difficult to 
justify the 5th Division remaining as 
a home service division in England. 
In late October, Borden and the 
Canadian War Committee considered 
if dissolution of the division was 
appropriate and wanted Perley and 
Turner’s views. Turner requested 
an analysis by his adjutant-general, 
Major-General P.E. Thacker. Without 
using the 5th Division, and assuming 
10,000 conscripts arrived in January, 
Thacker estimated the Canadian 
forces in France would still run 
out of replacements by May 1918, 
and this was before the outcome 
of the election on conscription was 
known.115 Borden again cabled Perley 
stating definitively that the War 
Committee had decided to break 
up the division.116 Despite the dire 
replacement prediction and the War 
Committee decision, both Perley 
and Turner agreed that the division 
organization should remain intact, 
but it be used to supply replacements 
if needed.117 Previously, the policy 
was that the division would only 
supply drafts if the reserve battalions 
had no replacements available.118 
This provokes the question why 
Perley and Turner agreed to keep 
the division intact. It was most 
likely political expediency related to 
the December 1917 federal election 
on the issue of conscription. The 
prime minister had persuaded select 
Liberals to join a Unionist Party slate 
in favour of conscription. To help 
ensure the election of the Unionist 
party, Borden also enacted a number 
of changes to the election act to give 
the government an edge, one of 
which was to allow overseas military 
votes to be assigned to, essentially, 
any riding the government wished.119 
Military votes from the contingents 
abroad were potentially critical to 
the government’s success, so it was 
imperative that the military vote 
for the government. Australia had 
run two referenda on conscription, 
and both failed, in part, because of 
the lack of support of the Australian 
military.120 Breaking up the 5th 
Division before the election could 
embitter its members and potentially 
throw its votes to the Opposition. 
The unpublished 5th Division history 
asserts highly placed military and 
government officials explicitly 
promised that if Borden’s Unionist 
party won the division would go to 
France.121 Hughes and members of the 
staff actively campaigned in favour of 
the Unionist government contrary 
to regulations.122 The Unionist party 
won the election by a sufficient 
majority, such that the military vote 
switching was not necessary.
With the elect ion success, 
the division anticipated it would 
soon cross to France.123 A further 
complication at this time was that the 
British were reducing each infantry 
brigade by one battalion because of 
manpower shortages.124 The British 
War Office suggested the Canadians 
adopt the same organization, which 
would free enough battalions to raise 
a sixth division and would necessitate 
a second corps. Initially, Kemp, who 
had replaced Perley as minister of 
the OMFC, and Turner favoured this 
proposal. Currie, however, opposed it 
and recommended the more efficient 
and effective approach of expanding 
the engineer, signals, machine gun 
and transportation establishments, 
and adding 100 supernumeraries 
to each of the existing infantry 
battalions.125 Kemp accepted the plan, 
but it would require disbanding the 
5th Division. 
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A shortage of replacements was the ultimate reason for the disbandment of 5th Division so that its 10,000 trained could be disbursed 
among the existing four divisons of the Canadian Corps. The influx of manpower was important in allowing the Canadian Corps to 
maintain its combat power during the heavy fighting of the Last Hundred Days campaign.
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Conscription was enacted, but 
there was to be a considerable lag 
before trained conscripts arrived at 
the front. Borden faced increasing 
pressure to disband the division as 
recovered wounded were sent back 
to the line, while the under-strength 
5th Division and its 10,000 trained 
infantry remained in England.126 
This was pressure he found difficult 
to resist.127 Following the election 
success, the need to respond to 
manpower shortages outweighed 
the necessity of maintaining the 
shell of the 5th Division and keeping 
Sam Hughes mollified through the 
employment of his son as a division 
commander. Kemp ordered the 
division’s disbanding on 10 February 
1918.128 This order was a shock to 
Garnet Hughes who lamented: “After 
all we had hoped and planned and 
worked for it was a stunning blow 
that the Division should be broken 
up.”129 
It was a similar blow to the 
division’s officers as many of them 
faced the prospect of having to 
return to Canada or revert in rank 
to get to France. In particular, there 
was a problem of what to do with 
the 120 surplus infantry captains, 
majors, and lieutenant-colonels from 
the disbanded battalions along with 
Garnet Hughes and his brother-
in-law, Byron Green, a battalion 
commander in 5th Division.130 After 
some initial reluctance and a plea 
from Kemp, Currie agreed to accept 
more surplus officers with most 
having to revert only a single rank. 
Any officer with experience overseas 
could return to the front at their 
previous rank.131 
The political implications of 
Garnet Hughes returning to Canada 
concerned Borden. Garnet, himself, 
demanded the War Office recall 
the British Regular Major-General 
Louis Lipsett, commander of the 3rd 
Division, as a means of creating a 
vacancy for him, but Kemp refused 
to intervene. Currie indicated he did 
not want Hughes, ostensibly because 
he had been away from the front for a 
year. Hughes rejected Turner’s offer 
of command of a training area, an 
appointment in which Hughes could 
retain his current rank.132 Eventually, 
Hughes accepted an unpaid position 
in the British Munitions Ministry and 
Green returned to Canada, without 
any backlash from Sam Hughes 
towards Borden or the government.133 
Contrary to the views of some 
historians, the breakup of the 5th 
Division did not solve the manpower 
crisis but did provide a vital buffer to 
supply the corps with well-trained 
reinforcements while the conscripts 
trained.134 Of the 10,000 infantry 
in the division, 7,200 became the 
source of the 100 supernumeraries 
per battalion and replacements for 50 
men per infantry battalion that Currie 
had drafted to bolster his machine 
gun organization.135 The usual losses 
in holding the line quickly used up 
the remaining 2,800 men long before 
the Battle of Amiens in August 1918. 
The other units of the division were 
sent as drafts to the Canadian Corps 
or added to replacement pools in 
England.
Conclusion
The 5th Division’s inception, career, and eventual fate were 
powerfully conditioned by Canadian 
political imperatives and the tension 
between the Canadian authorities’ 
wish to satisfy British demands and 
their recognition of the realities of 
manpower availability. Activated in 
part to ensure a divisional command 
billet for the son of the dangerous 
Sam Hughes, the 5th Division trained 
hard and effectively in difficult 
circumstances for battles it would 
never fight. Instead, once the threat of 
Hughes and other political necessities 
had receded, its well-trained infantry, 
machine gunners, engineers, and 
signallers were a valuable addition 
to the Canadian Corps. Ultimately, 
despite the unrelenting pressure 
of senior British officials and the 
call of empire, Perley, Kemp, and 
Turner placed greater importance on 
the pragmatic issues of manpower 
availability and Canadian interests. 
Had they not done so, the Canadian 
Corps would not have had the 
significant advantage of going into 
battle at full strength in the crucial 
offensives in the second half of 1917 
and in 1918. At some point if the 5th 
Division had gone to the Front, the 
Canadian authorities would have had 
the difficult choice of disbanding units 
or even divisions, with the resulting 
loss of influence, to maintain the 
corps at some semblance of strength. 
The unhappy history of the division 
illustrates how political expediency 
powerfully influenced decision-
making, but also the limits of how 
far senior Canadian politicians and 
military figures were willing to satisfy 
domestic and imperial political needs 
in the face of manpower constraints.
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